Activities of the US-Japan Safety Monitor Joint Working Group by Savercool, Richard L. & Cadwallader, Lee C.
INEEL/CON-04-01905 
PREPRINT
Activities Of The US-Japan Safety Monitor Joint 
Working Group 
R, L. Savercool 
L. C. Cadwallader 
September 14-16, 2004 
Sixteenth Topical Meeting on the Technology of 
Fusion Energy 
This is a preprint of a paper intended for publication in a 
journal or proceedings. Since changes may be made  
before publication, this preprint should not be cited or 
reproduced without permission of the author. 
This document was prepared as an account of work 
sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. 
Neither the United States Government nor any agency 
thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, 
expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or 
responsibility for any third party's use, or the results  
of such use, of any information, apparatus, product or 
process disclosed in this report, or represents that its  
use by such third party would not infringe privately  
owned rights. The views expressed in this paper are  
not necessarily those of the U.S. Government or the 
sponsoring agency. 
ACTIVITIES OF THE US-JAPAN SAFETY MONITOR JOINT WORKING GROUP
R. L. Savercoola and L. C. Cadwalladerb
aGeneral Atomics, P.O. Box 85608, San Diego, CA 92186-5608; savercool@fusion.gat.com 
bIdaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, P.O. Box 1625, Idaho Falls, ID 83415-3860 
This paper documents the activities of the US-Japan 
exchange in the area of personnel safety at magnetic and 
laser fusion experiments.  A near-miss event with a 
visiting scientist to the US in 1992 was the impetus for 
forming the Joint Working Group on Fusion Safety.  This 
exchange has been under way for over ten years and has 
provided many safety insights for both US and Japanese 
facility personnel at national institutes and at universities.  
The background and activities of the Joint Working 
Group are described, including the facilities that have 
been visited for safety walkthroughs, the participants from 
both countries, and the main safety issues examined 
during visits.  Based on these visits, some operational 
safety ideas to enhance experiment safety are given.  The 
near-term future plans of the Safety Monitor Joint 
Working Group are also discussed. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Part of the US-Japan Bilateral Agreement on Fusion 
Research1 is the Joint Working Group (JWG) on Fusion 
Safety.  This JWG was formed in 1992.  The US and 
Japan have hosted visiting researchers at each of the large 
tokamaks, major experiments and fusion research centers 
for decades.  Most of these exchanges have been 
performed quite well and without any safety incidents in 
either country.  Unfortunately, in early 1992, there was an 
event of concern in the US when a visiting Japanese 
researcher was overcome by leaking nitrogen coolant 
gas.2,3  After this event, discussions were held between the 
Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and the 
US Department of Energy (DOE) about conducting safety 
walkthroughs of fusion research facilities and experiments 
in each country.  Thus, the Safety Monitor JWG was 
formed.  The safety walkthrough is brief tour of a facility 
followed by suggestions to enhance the safety for visiting 
researchers. Initially, the walkthroughs were made once 
per year, with either US personnel traveling to Japan, or 
Japanese personnel traveling to the US.  In the mid-
1990’s the walkthrough results were assessed and found 
to be favorable for safety at most of the institutions 
visited, so the schedule was relaxed to a walkthrough visit 
every two years.  The JWG has noted that at least one 
other nitrogen gas event has been reported in the chemical 
industry4 since the fusion event in 1992.  In the more 
recent event there were several similarities to the fusion 
event.  Two chemical plant workers were performing a 
visual inspection of a 1.2 m-diameter steel pipe.  The 
workers covered the end of the pipe with opaque plastic to 
provide darkness so they could better inspect the interior 
pipe wall using a black light; they were unaware that 
nitrogen blanket gas was leaking and slowly collecting in 
the pipe, displacing the air.  They were not as fortunate as 
the fusion researcher; one of the two workers perished 
and the other suffered permanent impairment after 
asphyxia.  The US Chemical Safety Board has stated that 
there are typically 6 or 7 fatalities each year due to 
nitrogen gas asphyxiation in industry, laboratories, and 
medical facilities,5 although not all of these event 
descriptions are published in the literature.  The Safety 
Monitor JWG goal is to support fusion experiments so 
that the experiments can operate without any annual 
injuries or fatalities. 
Overall, the JWG has found fusion experiments to be 
well-run, but these experiments are not without hazards.  
For example, nearly all magnetic fusion experiments have 
suffered at least one electrical distribution system fire 
event,6 there have also been some resistive magnet fires 
and water coolant leaks that necessitated shutting down to 
effect repairs,7 small cryogen leaks,8 and large vacuum 
reservoirs are present that pose hazards to personnel.9
There are radiological hazards10 and unexpected 
experiment outages as well.11  Fusion experiments use 
large amounts of electrical power, use and generate many 
types of electromagnetic radiation, use cryogens, high 
pressure and temperature water and other coolants, and 
have other hazards as well.  Due diligence must be 
maintained around these experiments to continue to 
operate safely. 
II.  SAFETY WALKTHROUGHS 
The JWG has made walkthroughs of the major 
experiments in each country, including the Japan Torus 
Upgrade (JT-60U), the Large Helical Device, the 
GAMMA-10 mirror machine, and the GEKKO-XII laser
fusion experiment.  Some of the Japanese national 
facilities visited at Naka include the Superconducting 
Magnet Laboratory, the Radiofrequency Test Stand, the 
JAERI Electron Beam Irradiation System, and the Neutral 
Beam research facility.  At Tokai-mura, JWG members 
have visited the Tritium Process Laboratory, the 
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor 
(ITER) Reactor Structure Lab, and the Fusion Neutron 
Source.  Other, smaller experiments have also been 
visited at a number of Japanese universities, as given in 
Table I.   
JWG walkthroughs of US facilities have included 
major experiments, such as the Tokamak Fusion Test 
Reactor, the Advanced Torsatron Facility, the DIII-D 
tokamak, and the Alcator tokamak.  JWG members have 
also visited other national facilities, including Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory, the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 
Argonne National Laboratory, Sandia National 
Laboratories, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.  Educational 
facilities visited include the fusion experiments and test 
apparatus at the University of California (San Diego and 
Los Angeles campuses), the University of Wisconsin at 
Madison, the University of Texas, and the smaller 
experiments at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT).
JWG participants have included JAERI and DOE 
officials, and safety personnel from fusion institutes.  Past 
and present JWG participants are listed in Table II.  
III.  SAFETY WALKTHROUGH OVERVIEW 
The walkthroughs are generally short visits of 
perhaps one to two hours per facility, and they focus on 
overviews of the facility or experiment safety.  JWG 
members tour the facility and discuss safety issues with 
the hosts.  Often the hosts will correct any small lapses of 
safety, such as securing a gas cylinder, replacing a 
warning sign, etc.  Such actions show a proactive attitude 
toward safety that is greatly appreciated by the JWG.  
There are several safety items that are sought or noted in 
each JWG walkthrough visit.  These items are listed in 
Table III. 
TABLE I.  Japanese University experiments visited 
University of Tsukuba 
 Reversed field pinch 
 Super-Ashura laser 
 Tokamak plasma experiment 
Tohoku University 
 High temperature molten salt loop 
 Dynamitron particle accelerator 
 Helical stellarator 
 Alpha particle radioisotope lab 
 Plasma MHD device 
Tokyo University 
 Spherical torus 
 Reversed field pinch 
 Prototype ring trap experiment 
 Spherical tokamak 
 Diagnostics lab 
 Cryogenics lab 
Nagoya University 
 Nagoya divertor simulator 
 Dusty plasma machine 
 Current sustained tokamak 
 Hybrid tokamak 
 Tritium experiment lab 
Kyushu University 
 TRIAM-1M 
 Double plasma device 
 Linear plasma experiment 
 Laser lab 
Osaka University 
 Theta pinch 
 Field reversed configuration 
      injection experiment 
Kyoto University 
 Heliotron J 
 Wave torus 
 Low aspect ratio torus experiment 
Toyama University 
 Hydrogen isotope research center 
TABLE II.  Safety Monitor JWG Participants 
 Japanese Participants  
Prof. Teruo Tamano, University of Tsukuba 
Masatsugu Shimizu, JAERI 
Hiromi Hirabayashi, NIFS 
Hideo Okada, JAERI 
Prof. Yoichi Sakuma, NIFS 
Keisuke Hasegawa, JAERI 
Prof. Tatsuhiko Uda, NIFS 
Naoyuki Miya, JAERI 
Prof. Takao Kawano, NIFS 
Prof. Takayoshi Norimatsu, Osaka University 
Prof. Yuichi Takase, Tokyo University 
Mitsuru Otha, JAERI 
Haruo Obayashi, JAERI 
Ken’ichi Takagi, NIFS 
Isao Ohtake, NIFS 
 US Participants   
Steven Rossi, DOE 
Gene Nardella, DOE 
John Glowienka, ORNL 
Richard Savercool, General Atomics 
Joseph Smith, PPPL 
Lee Cadwallader, INEEL 
Matt Fulton, MIT 
Michael Viola, PPPL 
Catherine Fiore, MIT 
Tom Lovell, University of Wisconsin 
Joe Stencel, PPPL 
Jeff Williams, LLNL 
Phil Edmonds, University of Texas 
Several safety facts have been uncovered during the 
JWG visits.  The JWG has learned that, while it is rare for 
a fusion experiment to experience an emergency situation, 
emergencies have occurred at least once at all large fusion 
facilities and at most of the smaller experiments.  
Emergencies have included electrical fires, electrical arcs, 
large coolant leaks, personnel injuries (such as first aid 
cases, chemical exposures, and perhaps falls or electrical 
accidents), crane or hoist load drops, toppled equipment, 
and other events.  Therefore, emergency preparedness is 
an important aspect of operational safety at fusion 
experiments.  Without facility-specific training, people 
tend to revert to their original training.  Consider that for 
most US universities, the national emergency telephone 
number is 911.  For most Japanese universities, the 
national emergency telephone number is 119.  The JWG 
has noted that in both countries the universities rely on 
municipal emergency services.  A visiting researcher at a 
university, trying to summon emergency aid, could make 
a mistake under stressful conditions. 
TABLE III.  Safety Walkthrough Issues and Items 
x Experiments are operated professionally, with 
personnel aware of the hazards 
x Safety training is being performed for the staff  
and visitors 
x Safety manual or information is available  
and multi-lingual 
x Visitors would understand and be comfortable  
with the safety precautions at the facility 
x Appropriate safety warnings are in place around  
the facility 
x Emergency exits are marked and not blocked 
x Emergency equipment is marked and not blocked 
x Facilities are kept clean and combustible material  
storage is kept small 
x Fire extinguishers are marked and accessible 
x Telephone list with emergency numbers to call  
is displayed near the telephone 
x Electrical safety is observed 
x Electrical panels are accessible in case power  
shutoff is needed 
x Compressed gas cylinders are properly restrained 
x Chemicals are properly stored 
x Magnetic field safety is observed 
x Vacuum safety is observed 
x Radiofrequency energy safety is observed 
Another fact the JWG realized is that emergency 
services personnel are not typically multi-lingual.  To 
address that problem, one Japanese university posted the 
phonetic Japanese pronunciation of fire (“ka sai”) with the 
emergency phone number.  If the non-Japanese speaking 
caller dialed the emergency number and said this phonetic 
word, the emergency services operator would then send 
all types of emergency services personnel – firefighters, 
police, and paramedics – to the telephone’s location.  In 
that way, the responding personnel would be fully 
equipped for any emergency.  Some readers might 
consider this to be an inappropriately large response effort 
for an emergency, but it is a reality of the language barrier 
if the Japanese-speaking researchers are incapacitated and 
are unable to place the emergency call themselves.  The 
US universities tend to rely on visitors having an adequate 
command of English.  The national institutes in both 
countries typically have their own emergency brigades, or 
response teams and sometimes even their own fire 
departments, so they have an institutional emergency 
phone number.  These numbers vary a great deal.  For 
example, there are four-digit numbers at the Naka site 
(7222), at Princeton (3333), and at GA (2002), while the 
INEEL has a three-digit number (777).  It is important to 
post the emergency phone number prominently near 
telephones so that visitors in stressful emergency 
situations will use the correct emergency number.  
Dialing an incorrect number will lead to unnecessary 
delay in getting help and great frustration on the part of 
the caller that may lead to bad decisions. 
Several past reports of the JWG walkthroughs are 
available to download over the internet, at 
http://fusion.gat.com/safety/JWG/jwghome.html and 
http://www.nifs.ac.jp/collaboration/Japan-US/safety.pdf.
The US JWG members visiting Japanese facilities in 2004 
were impressed with the safety progress in nearly all of 
the labs and the attention that had been given to the items 
identified during the previous safety walkthrough in 1999.  
Some labs even discussed the 1999 safety items during 
their facility overview presentation and had the items 
listed along with their current response to date.  Some 
researchers have approached the JWG safety walkthrough 
as an unofficial, non-regulatory safety review of their 
facility and have taken guidance from the JWG on 
methods to improve operations safety.   
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Over the course of several JWG walkthroughs, the 
JWG members have noted potential enhancements to the 
safety of any fusion experiment facility.  There are some 
low cost actions that can be performed to aid visiting 
researchers and improve facility safety.  The first and 
foremost is to supplement the written safety signs with 
internationally recognized pictogram signs.  These are 
sometimes referred to as “universal symbols”.  There are 
several reasons for using pictogram symbols.  First, these 
pictograms transcend the language barrier and are much 
less expensive than translating all warning signs into 
another language.  Second, the visual picture reinforces 
any multi-lingual warning signs.  Third, the pictograms 
are memorable, usually more memorable than a worded 
sign.  Pictograms are available commercially through 
several safety equipment companies.  Some pictograms 
are also available in a text;12 many of the safety symbols 
presented in that text meet the direction given by the 
International Organisation for Standardization (ISO),13 the 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI),14 and the 
US National Fire Protection Association (NFPA).15  At 
most facilities, merely supplementing the existing signs 
with pictograms would be an inexpensive step to enhance 
safety while avoiding the cost of translation.  A few of the 
suggested pictograms, usually in color, are shown here in 
black and white drawings to serve as examples: 
Fire Exit   
High voltage   
Emergency Shower
The JWG has noted other low cost actions that can 
enhance operational safety.  These are: 
x Using daily safety checklists before experiment 
operation 
x Performing a visual search and sweep before 
commencing operation 
x Appointing a key person of the day to track safety and 
operations issues 
x Holding brief pre-operation meetings 
x Instituting once-a-month cleanup days 
The safety checklists help the operators and 
researchers to survey the facility before operation to 
verify that everything is in its proper place and that the 
machine is ready for operation.  Having operators walk 
through the facility can reveal conditions or situations that 
the control room instruments can not.  The visual 
observation guarantees that no one is left in the 
experiment room and can also spot any equipment that is 
not correctly set up before operation, such as loose tools 
near an electromagnet.  The “key person” concept is 
already in use at many facilities; this person tracks the 
details of the operating day.  Brief pre-operation meetings 
allow the staff and visitors tp discuss the day’s plan and 
any limitations that the experiment might be 
experiencing, equipment that should not be operated or 
operated with special provisions, etc.  Cleanup sessions 
keep facility combustibles reduced to low levels, reduce 
slipping and tripping hazards, keep exits clear of storage, 
keep electrical panels clear of storage, promote pride and 
good morale, and in general the JWG has found that well-
run operations with good house-keeping are also safe 
operations.  Experiments that are kept clean also generally 
give better scientific results.  These are very modest effort 
tasks that will increase the operational safety of fusion 
experiments.   
V.  FUTURE ACTIVITIES 
With continued support from DOE and JAERI, the 
JWG plans to continue with safety walkthroughs at the 
present frequency to keep safety a prominent part of the 
operation of fusion experiments and to maintain the 
experiment staff awareness of visitor safety.  The US 
JWG members completed a walkthrough in Japan in 
February 2004.  The next scheduled visit is for Japanese 
JWG safety personnel to visit US facilities in late 2005 or 
early 2006.  The facilities to be visited include the DIII-D 
tokamak at San Diego, the National Spherical Torus 
Experiment at Princeton, the Alcator C-Mod tokamak at 
MIT, the Safety and Tritium Applied Research facility at 
the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Lab, 
and other facilities, possibly including the National 
Ignition Facility.   
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